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Transnational Transfers and Peace Operations: The Empirically Elusive Quality of the Analytic Categories

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The invitation to participate in the conference that led to this volume asked participants to consider the ways in which contributions made by private individuals or groups in one country to others in another country might be better conceptualized in discussions of globalization.¹ Such transnational non-state transfers appeared to create considerable value for those receiving the transfers, yet this value-added was not well accounted for in discussions of the costs and benefits of globalization.

The analytic category of transfer denotes a one way, noncontractual flow of value. One example of such a transfer is remittances, transfers in which one party working outside of their home country voluntarily sends money to those who remain in the home country. This volume inquires into what other benefits (or costs) might be transferred across a broad spectrum of activities involving non-state actors. Thus the concern is with understanding the transfer of anything of value, including "money, goods, services, expertise, technology, or norms" (Brown 2009: 402), incorporating (unrequited) exports which seemed harder to track and the effects of which might be more difficult to measure. One of the opportunities and challenges of this effort is that it invites alternative perspectives from several disciplines. In our case, we approach the topic with an anthropological perspective.

Transnational appeared to create transfers as an analytical category raise a number of theoretical challenges. Among the binary distinctions involved are (1) non-state versus state, (2) transnational versus intra-national, and (3) transactions versus transfers. We were asked to examine peacekeeping operations in this context. In doing so, we were immediately struck by how these seemingly neat analytic distinctions

become much more complicated in particular situations when actual cases were considered.

Before moving to the analysis of peace operations, which we present below, we here highlight some of these descriptive and theoretical complications.

State and non-state actors. Descriptively peacekeeping presents a kind of hybrid case. It involves the movement of military and civilians under arrangements entered into by states (or proxies for states) in a context that is clearly describable as transactional, in that there is a clear *quid pro quo*. However, nested within these contractual arrangements is a wide range of acts undertaken by individuals and organizations in their private capacities. Some of these acts are transactional as well, in that they result from contractual arrangements that those associated with a peacekeeping operation enter into in their private capacities. Others appear to be transfers, as when money earned as a result of working or a peacekeeping operation is remitted home. In their private capacities people associated with peacekeeping operations may also volunteer time to improve some aspect of the place in which they find themselves, or they may contribute by transferring norms such as democratic governance that some would argue constitute positive "goods." As we describe below, however, a number of these transfers are patently negative.

Transnational and intra-national arrangements. Clearly, arrangements that cross-national boundaries implicate sovereignty in interesting ways. Smock and Crocker (1995: 9–12) suggest that sovereignty is realized as effective state governance including four basic functions: (1) oversight and supervision of the nation's resources; (2) effective and rational revenue collection from goods, people, and services; (3) building and maintaining national infrastructure; and (4) the ability to render social services. In many cases such as traditional remittances (where workers abroad return funds to their home country) these transfers may be so large that the home country's economy becomes dependent upon their receipt (Ratha and Xu 2008), making the exercise of sovereign action dependent on externalities. Likewise, especially in smaller and "developing" countries multinational corporations may act in ways that make it difficult for a country's governing authority to take independent sovereign actions (Rubinstein 1998).

In effect, transnational transfers may constrain a nation's ability to act as an independent agent. If the ability to act as an independent agent is taken as the lens through which to examine the transfer, then the distinction between transnational and intra-national seems less clear. Intra-national arrangements may also affect the abilities of

regional institutions (counties, cities, townships) and individuals to act independently.

Transactions and transfers. Perhaps the single most important analytic distinction explored in this volume is that between arrangements which have an acknowledged *quid pro quo*, broadly, transactions, and those which are characterized as lacking such a *quid pro quo*, transfers. Transfers, arrangements in which value flows in one direction only, are taken to be a kind of philanthropic act. From an anthropological and evolutionary perspective, philanthropic acts are a kind of altruism. For us, the kinds of transfers being considered in this volume therefore need to be understood in relation to emerging understandings of altruism in humans.

The existence of altruism is one of the enduring questions about the evolution of the human species, which is essentially social. Altruistic acts pose an evolutionary problem because they come at some cost to the altruistic individual, reducing their evolutionary fitness (typically measured by an individual's reproductive success). This problem has been taken up by a number of disciplines such as anthropology, economics, game theory, genetics, and neurobiology.²

There is emerging a strong understanding that altruistic acts return nontrivial benefits to those who do them. Models of altruism show that acts that are seemingly selfless return important benefits to those who do them. These benefits may be the conditioning of how others act toward the altruist – reciprocal altruism, a real improvement in genetic fitness for the altruist – inclusive fitness (Barash 2008, Ernst Mayr 1997), changes in the general perception of the altruist which improve their own life chances (Lotem et al. 2002), triggering of internal biochemical changes that reward the altruist, and even changes in brain structures (Austin 2001, Fehr and Rockenbach 2004).

In relation to the analytic distinction between transactions and transfers, the broader point is that although, superficially transfers and transactions appear to differ greatly, there cannot be any absolute distinction between them; comprehending their dynamics and effects can only be accomplished contextually. Perhaps, therefore, transnational transfers might better be thought of as an empirical endpoint, rather than as an analytical starting point.

Arrangements which appear to be unidirectional on one level may in fact accrue benefits to another. And, those returned benefits may well outweigh the value of the acts that trigger them. Thus, for instance, religious NGOs provide important services throughout the world. These services may be the provision of health care, care for children, or other

beneficial social programs in areas of need. On the surface, these appear to be selfless acts. For example, in peacekeeping and other interventions, some see the transfer of norms of governance or legal systems as a positive “good” brought to the areas where interventions take place. To the contrary, local peoples might view these “goods” negatively, as disrespecting or frustrating long-standing patterns of action (for example, Hohe 2003, 2002). And, deeper analysis shows that significant benefits accrue to the individuals delivering the services and to the denominations supporting them (Flannigan 2010). Similarly, for the case of peacekeeping, which we present in some detail below, the seemingly selfless act of intervention turns out to have important reciprocal value for the interveners. These benefits come in the form of the creation of friendly markets that adhere to economic and political norms that favor the interveners and promote their continued political and economic power (Chopra 2000, Hohe 2003, Paris 2002, Rubinstein 2010).

In this chapter we seek to develop a preliminary understanding of what we call the unintended consequences and hidden ramifications of the presence of peacekeeping missions. In the context of discussions that seek to define the value and effects of private transfers, these consequences are particularly important. Reviewed through the prism of peacekeeping, distinctions between private and public action, and between transnational and local action are more elusive than they appear at first glance. Part of this complexity reflects the fact that certain indirect effects are not transactional, that is they are not part of the contractually agreed framework within which peacekeeping operates. Nonetheless, they affect the mission, the local population, and also peacekeepers' countries of origin. For the purposes of this chapter, we conceptualize the unintended consequences and hidden ramifications of peacekeeping as kinds of exchanges, since we do not accept that value flows in only one direction. We also extend the traditional concept of a remittance as a “transfer of money from an individual... to another individual” (Biller 2007: 1) to include also exchanges of value involving goods, ideas, services, cultural norms, or socioeconomic (in) equalities.

Peacekeeping and exchanges of value

Peacekeeping operations have become a major instrument of international action during the past 50 years. Although not provided for explicitly in the United Nations Charter, peacekeeping is generally undertaken under the direction of the Security Council, through resolutions that

define their scope and activities. United Nations peace operations have evolved dramatically over the course of their six-decade life. In the approximately 60 operations undertaken under United Nations auspices from the first peace mission, involving the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), begun in 1948 to monitor cease fire agreements and promote peace between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East, to the more recent United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), begun in 2006 to aid Sierra Leone emerge from its civil war, peace operations have been mandated to perform an expansive range of activities. United Nations peace operations are legitimated by reference to the United Nations Charter, either Chapter 6 ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes") and Chapter 7 ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). They involve a variety of activities, including those of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping operations. Some missions call for armed peacekeeping forces, others for military observers. Some are mandated to monitor cease fire agreements, others to conduct active fighting, while still others in the distribution of humanitarian aid and training of local police forces. Recently, there has been an upsurge in the involvement of regional political organizations such as NATO and the African Union in maintaining regional peace and security. Peace operations mandated by these regional organizations function along similar lines as UN operations. A recent example of a peace operation undertaken by a regional organization is the involvement of the African Union in the ongoing violence in Darfur in the Sudan.

Despite the diversity of form and activities among peace operations, all have a certain institutionally established element of transactional arrangements in common.³ Unless presented with an absolutely dire threat to international peace and security, all peace operations must respect the sovereignty of the host nation. Further, troops or civilian observers for a peace operation are deployed on a specific mandate that is agreed upon by the contributing and host countries. Thus, peace operations are in many ways transactional agreements, the abandonment of which jeopardizes the mandate and future relationships between the contributing and host countries. These operations are conceptualized and materialized in a truly cosmopolitan arena that involves the crossing of cultures, histories, and socio-politico-economic differences. That there are uncalculated effects beyond the institutionally mandated transactional arrangements in peace operations is inevitable.

In this chapter we distinguish between two kinds of remittances: those that involve money and those that involve something of nonmonetary

value. These we further distinguish from two kinds of transactional effects arising from a mission: those that derive from the mission mandate and those that develop outside of the mission's institutional framework. Although peacekeeping is seen as a public (that is, state-driven) action, those transfers that take place outside of the mission's mandated activities map more closely on to the category of private transfers. Yet, the outside-mandate transactions result from the deployment of an international or regional mission in the area. While they are not a part of the mandate they are necessary for the mandate to function. On the other side of the spectrum are unintended consequences of a peace operation that are not directly related to the mandate. Straddling between these two concepts are classic remittances – the flow of money by the peacekeepers back to their home country. All four types of exchanges – mission mandate transactions, outside mandate transactions, classic remittances and "transfers" – can have positive or negative effects. Figure 9.1 illustrates the relationships between these concepts.

Evident from the diagrammatic description (Figure 9.1) is the complexity of the effects of peace operations. These can manifest themselves horizontally from peace operation back to troop contributing




Figure 9.1 A model of transactional and non-transactional exchanges in peace operations

country or vertically from peace operation to host country and local population.⁴ Many effects that fall outside of the formally recognized aspects of peace missions can be characterized as negative in their consequences for people and societies. We do not mean this analysis to be a wholesale critique of peace operations, which we view as an essential and effective instrument of international action. Rather, our analysis is intended to look at the "lower level" effects of missions with the aim of identifying how these effects arise and how their impact can be better understood so that it can be anticipated and managed more effectively.⁵ As well, we hope this discussion will further the understanding of how the influence of peace operations extends beyond the mission area and has transnational transfer effects (Rubinstein 2008).

Transactional effects – vertical effects from peace operation into host country

One of the direct effects of a peace operation deployed in a conflict region is on the local economy of the host country. This is a direct result of the "transaction" derived in the mandate of a peace operation which usually involves services such as maintaining a cease fire between warring factions, creating conditions for power transfers and/or democratic institutions, and in certain cases actually using force to bring about a cessation of violence. The local economy is influenced in two basic ways – employment of the locals and renting of space by the peace operation. Both actions have the potential to positively or negatively affect the local economy in diverse ways.

Using people and space – effects on local economies

The presence of an international peacekeeping force tends, in general, to distort local economies in two ways. First, missions hire local support staff. Frequently these support staff are paid at rates greater than they could earn in the local economy. Second, missions need facilities, and these are often obtained by paying a premium for spaces rented to accommodate the mission's needs.

Peace operations employ locals and pay them much higher wages than national salary levels. For example, Ammitzboll (2007: 76) writes that "locals who work with international organizations earn four to five times more than local colleagues who stay within local institutions." This has two consequences. First, unskilled laborers working for peace missions earn more than their counterparts working in the

open economy. Thus, for instance, a cleaning lady working in a building occupied by a peace operation can earn triple the amount than a government minister (Ammitzboll 2007: 76–78).

Second, a kind of "local hire syndrome" develops in which highly skilled professionals work in unskilled, often, menial positions. This occurs because they can earn more in unskilled positions with the peace operation than they could when practicing their profession in the open market. So you have local doctors or professors working as drivers or local bodyguards of peacekeeping troops.

In the same way that peacekeeping missions place demands on the local labor markets, so too they affect other aspects of local economies. When missions arrive in an area, they are in need of spaces to house their operations. To meet their space requirements, the mission is prepared to secure that space by paying rents that would in other circumstances be considered usurious. For instance, rents jumped 500% when the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) arrived on site.⁶

Also, members of the peace operations get paid extra for their service in peacekeeping missions, and thus get a much higher salary than they would in their home country. For example, officers on a UN peace operation can earn up to \$1000 a month extra, which significantly increases their spending capacity. (Not to mention that they are much better off economically than the local population in the host country.) In these situations a two-tiered economy may develop. As Bhatia (2003: 95) notes, "In East Timor a two-tier economy emerged. International civil servants consumed a growing variety of Western luxuries, from cappuccino to imported French wine, many with a price far greater than the weekly or even monthly salary of most Timorese, while the population struggled to rebuild homes and lives."⁷

For some individuals, these extra payments are returned to their home countries as classic remittances. The opportunity to make this extra money and to send it home is one factor that motivates some individuals to serve in peace operations (Rubinstein 2003:18). For some poorer countries, participation in peacekeeping is a recognized way of bolstering the national economy.

Exchanges of value

The effect of the employment of locals and their space by an international peace operation can result in several exchanges, positive and negative, monetary and nonmonetary. The local hire syndrome and the

increased rents distort the local economies and change local relationships in many ways. First, in many places where peacekeeping missions are deployed, social obligations flow along kinship lines. A person with the resources is often socially obligated to support their extended kin network. When they do this, they change the transactional benefit of their employment (which gives them increased salaries and a much higher spending capacity than before) into a remittance transfer to this extended kinship network. The prospects of earning triple or quadruple the amount for the UN or a regional political institution such as the AU or NATO can potentially change the socioeconomic status of a segment of the population. While this has the immediate positive effect of raising standards of living, also implicit in this change in economic dynamic are much more complex impacts.

With increased buying capacity of some locals and the high wages of peace operations' officers, demands for goods and services may also increase which may result in the boosting of the economy. There is a greater demand for businesses and entertainment and thus an atmosphere conducive to entrepreneurship might be fostered. Apart from economic growth of a conflict region, this development may also substantially help in post-conflict reconstruction through developing local relationships. Thus, a peace operation in a conflict-torn, unstable region which employs local labor and space ends up affecting the local economy. The boosting of the economy and tangential relationships formed through this process can be considered positive "good" for local populations.

However, the arrival of the international community may also bring feelings of resentment and the possibility of social strife amongst locals due to the effects of the local hire syndrome (Ammitzball 2007, Rubinstein 2008). Kosovars, during the UN mission in Kosovo UNMIK, reported a rising antagonism and bitterness amongst the professionals who were paid much less than unskilled labor working for UNMIK. Kaçinari (2001: 2) describes this situation from the perspective of the local population:

Kosovar Albanians are adjusting themselves accordingly. They know that it is an artificial economy, and that it won't last forever. But they want to benefit from the situation as long as possible. There are waiting lists for English and computer courses. Many young people put off returning to their university studies in order not to lose their jobs. Meanwhile, the frustration grows of professors, teachers, and

doctors, who are maintaining fundamental services for pitiful salaries. And the disappointment increases of experts placed in international agencies, who in most of the cases have no knowledge of the local situation.

Another example is the UN involvement in Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2002. Due to the much higher pay packages offered by the UN and other international organizations present in Afghanistan, most of the "talented and skilled civil servants left immediately their government jobs immediately in favor of international NGOs, the United Nations, embassies and other employment opportunities that materialized when the international community arrived. The new jobs paid salaries from 10–50 times more per month" (Ammitzball 2007: 77). In a recent conversation with one of the authors [RAR], an Afghan Colonel described that his employment depended upon the presence of the international mission, and he went on to explain that as a result he was able to use his income to provide for a large extended kin network; again, turning a transactional exchange into a remittance transfer.

In situations where the international community's intervention involves the creation of a very extensive transitional government which takes over most functions of government (for discussion of the range of possible interventions, see Chopra and Hohe 2004) the brain and talent drain from the public administration infrastructure of an already conflict-weakened state makes it much more dependent on international assistance (Chopra 2000). Post-conflict reconstruction becomes much harder for a state to achieve if the fledgling government is comprised of inexperienced and unprepared individuals, who are being instructed by the international community to establish governance systems that are unconnected with indigenous political norms (see, for example, Hohe 2003).

Wage disparities also have the secondary negative effect of increasing poverty and economic strain on the locals not fortunate enough to be employed with the international force. Due to the increased prices of basic commodities such as food, many people are forced to have two jobs to be able to subsist and provide for their families which results in creating an artificial microcosm of intensely tied-in economic relationships very much dependent on the presence of the peace operation. There is the possibility that when the mandate of the peace operation expires, the local economy will again be thrown into turmoil.

Human trafficking and disease – an exchange of value?

The distorted local economy which results from the deployment of a peace operation can lead to the distortion of social relations and to criminality. One of the more written about local industries that experiences a growth in services provided is prostitution and the sex industry, which may be conceptualized as a negative exchange. There are two basic reasons for this. The first is that participants in a peace operation have a much higher capacity to spend than the locals and have been found to invest quite a bit in formal settings that employ sex workers such as local brothels, massage parlors, bars, and other public arenas. The second is sexual exploitation of locals in nonformal settings. Both result in increased human rights violations, trafficking of women and children, and a growing underground sex industry which brings with it a host of social and health problems (Kent 2007).

Sexual exploitation by peacekeepers is a well-documented phenomenon that adversely affects the local population and can be considered a negative exchange of value from the deployment of a peace operation. For instance, several UN-established International Police Task Force (IPTF) and NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were reported to have frequented nightclubs that were involved in trafficking women (Lynch 2001, UNIFEM 2005). Murthy (2007: 165) writes that in the "Bunia province of the Congo alone, UN investigators documented 68 cases of rape, prostitution and pedophilia involving the Pakistani personnel, along with contingents from Nepal, South Africa, Uruguay and others in 2004." Accounts of relationships between locals and international staff have also been reported with many expatriates and peacekeepers acquiring "part-time wives" during their stint in a peace operation, as specifically reported for the mission in Cambodia (Koyama and Myrntinen 2007: 32). Apart from possibly being nonconsensual and the local being forced into such a relationship due to economic reasons, these relationships are also problematic in terms of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and what have come to be known as "peacekeeping babies." All of these must be counted as negative, nonmonetary exchanges.

Peacekeepers, and their involvement in sexual activities while on a mission, have been complicit in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Although it is understandably difficult to get dependable information on the sexual practices of officers in a peace operation, certain correlations have been drawn between participation in a peace operation in an already HIV/AIDS prevalent region and the further spread of

the disease. For instance, "HIV prevalence among Nigerian troops is directly related to the numbers of years spent away from home on duty as peacekeepers" (Aning 2007: 142). The deployment of peace operations in Cambodia (UNTAC) and East Timor (UNTAET) has also been documented to have increased the prevalence of the disease in these countries. Further, the countries from which officers are deployed may already have a high prevalence of the virus and aid in the spreading of the epidemic. For instance, the 32% of the participants in the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) set by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone were from countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the subsequent measures of the disease have been reported to have increased in Sierra Leone since their deployment (Elbe 2003: especially, chapter 3).

The effect of the threat of the disease is twofold. First, it strains the health system in a region in which the health infrastructure is already being stretched and it weakens the human resource sector by increasing the number of diseased individuals which negatively impacts a society trying to emerge from a conflict. Second, the risk of the spread of disease also negatively influences the troop contributing country by increasing the threat of the virus within the country and making it less likely to contribute its citizens to an international or transnational peace operation.

"Peacekeeping babies" are also a negative result of the activities of certain officers of peace operations. They are children of local women fathered by peacekeepers and usually abandoned by them when the mandate expires and the officers leave. Both the spread of HIV/AIDS and the prevalence of peacekeeping babies result in adversely affecting the local population, and especially of the status of local women involved: "Given the traditional concepts in Timorese society, which look down on premarital sex, the women are viewed as 'damaged goods' and often face being ostracized by the community" (Koyama and Myrntinen 2007: 38).

Thus far we have mostly discussed the vertical impact of the deployment of a peace operation in a conflict-torn region. Aside from the transactional effects of increased employment of people and space by the peace operation, also encountered are several monetary and non-monetary exchanges which impact the host country's social, economic, and political spheres in positive and negative ways. Also important in the discussion of unintended consequences of peace operations are horizontal impacts that affect the troop contributing country, which form the basis of the following discussion.

Horizontal effects from remittances going home

Effects of peace operations on the troop contributing country fall under two basic categories with various extended effects. The first is what we call a classic remittance – the traditional notion of money being sent back home. As previously discussed, peacekeepers tend to earn much more when on a UN-, AU-, or NATO-funded operation than they would in their national militaries. For instance, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) is usually recruited by the UN in its peace operations and officers can “earn mission service allowances of US\$ 100–135 per day depending on the volatility of the conflict area” (Aning 2007: 141). In some cases, annual savings on a mission exceed what officers could expect to earn in a lifetime. Similarly, Sotomayor (2007: 176) writes that “by 2002, 63% of all armed forces personnel were making less than 716 Argentine pesos a month (about US\$250). Conversely, on a peace mission, non-commissioned officers were being paid US\$1,000 a month.” Thus, often peace operations and the opportunity to participate in one are regarded as income generators and incredibly beneficial to participate in.

Furthermore, peace operations also provide an opportunity to professionalize and build the capacity of local armies. For instance, in an effort to increase regional peace operations such as ECOWAS and the African Union, the United States government provides financial resources and equipment which greatly benefit the armed forces of the countries and serve as incentives to participate in international and transnational peace operations. Under the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has received “over \$3.4 million worth of training equipment” (Aning 2007: 138). While this represents a more traditional transaction, the secondary reported effects of such interactions with international militaries can arguably be considered exchanges of value under the framework of this chapter. For instance, Murthy (2007: 166) quotes a peacekeeper on the benefits of being involved in an international peace operation: “The opportunities in terms of international training exposure, interoperability with multinational forces and cross-cultural exchanges make definite improvement in the professional outlook of the peacekeepers.” This is especially true for countries with underfunded and ill-trained armies such as those of Bangladesh and Nepal. Participation in peace operations gives them the opportunity to interact with more professionalized and better trained European and American armies – lessons which they take back home. Thus from the perspective of the troop

contributing country, peace operations can be regarded as “profitable investment opportunities” (Heiberg 1990: 160) in that they benefit the national army as well as individual peacekeepers and their families.

Another impact of participation in peace operations for troop contributing countries which is more secondary than the classical remittance is the idea that it is used as a diversion for the national armies by governments. Therefore, Argentina’s rise as “the most active Latin American troop supplier and one of the top five troop-contributing countries in the period between 1992 and 1996” (Sotomayor 2007: 173) was directly following a coup attempt in 1990. Furthermore, “officers and soldiers who had revolted at least three times against the re-emerging Argentine democracy were now being sent to missions abroad” (Sotomayor 2007: 173). Thus, participation in an international peace operation offers the troop contributing country an opportunity to shift “the role of the armed forces from domestic politics towards internationalism” (Sotomayor 2007: 174), thus allowing for the development of a greater civilian control of government affairs. Bangladesh, too, having previously suffered from a very political national army has benefited from its involvement in international peace operations. With the various financial benefits of participation in these operations, the Bangladeshi army is more anxious to be recruited and has withdrawn attention from domestic politics, giving a chance for democracy to flourish (Murthy 2007: 160).

Also influenced by participation in international peace operations are the foreign policies and bilateral relations of the troop contributing countries. For instance, Argentina has used this avenue to establish its identity as a dependable nation. Thus, through “troop deployments to missions in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti, which were highly esteemed and valued by US government officials at the time,” Argentina expressed its “international commitment” and legitimacy (Sotomayor 2007: 180). Participation in peace operations has provided a forum for increased interaction and understanding between countries with strained relations. Thus, as Murthy writes, “[w]hatever political strains have marked relations between the two countries, Indian and Pakistani troops have worked in camaraderie when they have put on ‘blue helmets’ in a third country” (2007: 161). Thus, peace operations provide an opportunity not only to pursue a certain foreign policy agenda in the international political arena but also to serve as a track II diplomacy tactic for strengthening relations between countries.

Conclusion

This chapter examines the analytic distinctions underlying the notion of non-state transnational transfers in the context of peacekeeping. These distinctions include the divide between public and private action, and differences between transfers and remittances. As well, they raise concerns about the meaning and extent of sovereignty. By focusing on the values and effects of actions taken by members of peacekeeping missions outside of their official roles and duties, some of which are also unintended consequences of peacekeeping, this chapter highlights ways in which the construct of non-state transfers remains problematic and contestable.

From their very conception, peace operations have been fraught with multilayered intricacies and cannot be straightforwardly categorized by any one feature. An apt example is the current political debate about the limits of sovereignty in situations where governments are not protecting, or actively abusing, their citizens and where peace operations might thus be called for. The "responsibility to protect" lies in direct opposition to the state's right to sovereign actions (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001), which has been notably publicized by the President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans. Evans emphasizes that to prevent another Rwanda or Srebrenica, to actually realize the rallying cry of "never again," rhetoric needs to shift from sovereign rights of the state to their "responsibility to protect people at grave risk" (Evans 2007).

While there is a transactional quality to many aspects of a peace operation what actually takes place elides the easy distinction between public and private transactions and between transactions and transfers such as remittances. The political expectations of the host country and the international organization mandating the operation cannot be ignored. They will have far-reaching impacts beyond the official agreement in the mandate document. Thus, our efforts in this chapter have been to highlight that engaging in such dichotomies not only lead to false understandings of the dynamics of peace operations but also can be dangerous misrepresentations of their far-reaching impact.

A distinct illustration is the consideration of national interests that provide incentives or alternatively, preclude a nation from committing its sources to a peace operation. One aspect has been elucidated with regards to countries such as Argentina and Bangladesh investing their troops in international peace operations to divert their attention

from national politics. Another aspect of similar motivations is seen in South Africa's involvement in Chad or the French and Belgian involvement in the UNAMIR force that was witness to the 1994 genocide. Neethling (2003) writes that a stable, peaceful, and economically viable African continent is in South Africa's national interest. This interest has been manifested in the country's national defense force being involved in two UN peace operations – the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Similarly, Belgian and French involvement in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was very much in line with precolonial political relationships with various ethnic groups in Rwanda. Apart from being political, they dramatically affected the outcome of the mission which extended beyond the official mandate. They were, undoubtedly, nonmonetary exchanges between the troop-contributing and host country that affected the lives of ordinary Rwandans in unimaginable ways. Thus, very explicit decisions are made in terms of exchanges of value that could be obtained from peace operations which only serve to highlight their incredibly complex nature.

We have also tried to describe how another commonly understood aspect of peace operations in terms of classic monetary remittances sent home by peacekeepers employed by an international agency such as the UN or the AU actually involves a much more complex set of relations. We recognize their immense importance in the international arena in the fight against human rights violations and in bringing peace and stability to war-torn regions. Peace operations are key instruments for the international community to participate in the physical, social, and economic well-being of fellow citizens who face threats of gross violations of their human rights. However, to be seen simply as international or regional mandates or as opportunities for soldiers to send money home is a misleading endeavor.

Peace operations are neither benign undertakings by well-meaning political members of the international community nor they cleverly maneuvered disasters. In many ways, they are as Pieterse says, "idealism caught in the wheels of realism, realism outflanked by realities" (Pieterse 1997: 72). Their impact influences social, political, and economic norms in both the troop contributing and host countries predictably and intentionally, as well as in various unintentional ways. The legacies of the exchanges made during peacekeeping last long after the operations end and are archived in the annals of international memory.

Notes

This chapter is revised and expanded from Kudesia and Rubinstein. (2009) "Exchanges of Value in Peace Operations: Complex Meanings of 'Private' and 'Transnational' Transfers, *International Studies Review* 11: 430-439.

1. This chapter was originally prepared for the Conference on Private Transnational Transfers, held at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 18-19 October 2007.
2. A few examples of this literature from anthropology, biology, economics, political science and sociology include: Andreoni (1990), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Barash (2008), Fehr and Rockenbach (2004), Kennett (2006), Lotem, Fishman and Stone (2002), Monroe (1994), and Singer, et al. (2004).
3. By transaction we mean a situation in which there is an explicit expectation of exchange between the parties. That is, where something is "bought and sold," either literally or figuratively.
4. For more on the distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" dynamics in peacekeeping, see Rubinstein, Robert A., Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger. (2008) "Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions." *International Peacekeeping* 15(4): 540-555.
5. Our notion of "lower level" effects is analogous to looking for important effects below the level of the nation-state in international security analysis, see, Rubinstein, Robert A. and Mary LeCron Foster (eds) (1997 [1988]) *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security*. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt.
6. James Quesada, personal communication. Quesada, now at California State University, San Francisco, was at the time conducting anthropological fieldwork in Nicaragua.
7. Tanja Hohe Chopra (personal communication) cautions that this is a complex situation since even in such economically distorted situations, positive outcomes may be achieved: "[internationals'] rents actually allowed people to buy their first seeds again and plant their field, they really kick-started their lives again - they would have never achieved to get back on their feet otherwise."

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